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Abstract  
This paper investigates the mechanisms determining spatial interactions in deforestation, 
and its transmission channels, using data from Brazil. Our preliminary results confirm the 
hypothesis that deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is characterized by complementarity, 
meaning that deforestation in a particular municipality tends to increase deforestation in its 
neighbors. We further show that cattle density, tend to be the most important factors 
determining the nature of spatial interactions between neighboring areas. 
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1 Introduction
Despite global concerns over forest protection, tropical deforestation continues at an alarming
pace. For instance, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is estimated at more than 5800 sq.
kilometers in 2013, although a decreasing trend was observed in the last decade (INPE, 2013).1
There exists a vast literature on the determinants of deforestation; factors such as increased
agricultural output prices, better agro-ecological conditions, lower input prices, better roads and
infrastructure as well as technological progress have been shown to favor forest conversion (e.g.
Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998; Barbier and Burgess, 2001; Andersen et al., 2002). Moreover, this
literature has confirmed that forest conversion and land-use changes are phenomena that exhibit
spatial patterns (e.g. Mertens et al., 2002; Pfaff et al., 2007; Robalino and Pfaff, 2012).
Spatial interactions in forest conversion can be of two types. In fact, deforestation in a given
region can either increase or decrease forest conversion in neighboring areas. The empirical liter-
ature on deforestation has indeed provided examples of both types of interactions. For example,
Robalino and Pfaff (2012) show a positive spatial contagion when looking at deforestation in Costa
Rica; they observe that deforestation in one county favors deforestation in neighboring areas. In
Amazon, several studies (Amin et al., 2014; Corrêa de Oliveira and Simões de Almeida, 2010;
Aguiar et al., 2007; and Igliori, 2006) have addressed this issue. These studies highlight a strong
influence (positive) of spatial interactions on the dynamics of deforestation in the region. However,
these studies, based on cross-sectional data, do not take into account the dynamic aspects of defor-
estation. Controlling for dynamic aspects is essential as it is now well established that deforestation
is a dynamic process, in which changes to key factors occurring in previous periods are likely to
affect current conditions and, therefore, current decisions. For instance, areas that were previously
partially cleared may be easier to access and deforest today. Similarly, public policies such as
subsidized credit lines or colonization programs may take a few years to impact deforestation.
However, Pfaff et al. (2014) when applying matching methods to the investigation of impacts of
protected areas (PAs) in the Brazilian Amazon, find lower deforestation rates around some PAs than
would be expected without PAs. In the same vein, it has been shown that increased agricultural
productivity and lower transport costs in one region may result in a concentration of activities in
that same region, thus lowering pressure on forest in adjacent areas (e.g. Angelsen and Kaimowitz,
1998; Weinhold and Reis, 2008). Finally, the literature on forest protection and REDD has showed
1http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/prodes_1988_2013.htm, accessed on January 7th, 2014.
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that policies promoting forest conservation in a given area might result in increased deforestation
elsewhere (e.g. Angelsen, 2008).
The first aim of this paper is to investigate the mechanisms behind spatial interactions and the
conditions under which each type of interaction, positive or negative, may materialize, while jointly
controlling for dynamic aspects. The second objective is to analyze the impact of policies to fight
against deforestation on the nature of spatial interactions. We will focus particularly on Action
Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon.
Improving our understanding of the mechanisms behind these different types of spatial interac-
tions should lead to more efficient forest protection measures (Amin et al., 2014).
We first present a simple theoretical setting that allow us to investigate the determinants of
spatial interactions in tropical deforestation. In Section 3, we estimate these interactions using
a model that includes both spatial and dynamic correlations. The dynamic aspect is represented
by the use of lagged values of the main explanatory variables. Regarding the spatial interactions,
we build a spatial weight matrix, in the spirit of Anselin (2003), that links land-use changes in
a given county to land-use changes elsewhere as an inverse function of the distance between the
two locations. In particular, by allowing us to disentangle direct and indirect spatial interactions,
our empirical model enables the investigation of the economic factors determining the type of
spatial interaction that materialize in different regions. Section 4 reports and discusses the results.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 A theoretical spatial analysis of deforestation
We first present a general model of spatial interactions, before giving a more specified approach
of spatial distribution.
2.1 General spatial model
We consider here n Legal Amazon counties, each illustrated by a representative agent. Each
municipality chooses its level of deforestation in order to maximize its utility:
max
Di
Ui(Di, Xi,
∑
j Ó=i
ρijDj ,
∑
j Ó=i
βijXj). (1)
municipality i’s utility obtained by clearing Di hectares of forest is assumed to depend on its
exogenous characteristics Xi, which encompass outside opportunities, human development, distance
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to the main markets, and other economic factors likely to affect its demand for forest conversion.
Additionally, it depends on the deforestation level of neighboring counties Dj and intensity of
interactions ρij to those neighbors. It can also depend on i’s neighbors exogenous variables Xj and
interactions intensity βij .
As mentioned in the Introduction, two kinds of interactions may exist between counties. First,
under what we call a complementarity situation, observing a high deforestation level on its neigh-
bors’ land may incite a municipality to increase its own level of deforestation. This may be the
case if the neighbors show that forest conversion fosters local development. Second, under a substi-
tutability situation, observing a high level of deforestation in neighbors may lead municipality i to
reduce its own deforestation. This can be the case if a neighbors’ deforestation increase municipal-
ity i’s outside opportunities or if it decreases its benefits from deforestation. Similarly, substitution
may occur if deforestation agents migrate from municipality i to the surrounding areas.
The First-Order Conditions of problem (4) implicitly give the optimal level of deforestation D∗i
of municipality i, which depends on its own characteristics, its neighbors best response D∗j and
characteristics Xj :
D∗i = Di(Xi,
∑
j Ó=i
ρijD
∗
j (Xj),
∑
j Ó=i
βijXj). (2)
From this very simple model, it is possible to infer how deforestation in a particular municipality
is influenced by its neighbors’ deforestation. Proposition 1 below summarizes this.
Proposition 1: municipality i’s deforestation level will tend to be closer to its neighbors’ if
both have the same exogenous characteristics. Moreover, observing a high level of deforestation in
the neighborhood will tend to decrease municipality i’s deforestation in a substitutability situation,
while it will tend to increase it in a complementarity situation. Similarly, a characteristic Xj
will tend to decrease i’s deforestation if it is a factor of substitutability, and to increase i’s
deforestation if it is a factor of complementarity.
In the following, we present a spatially-explicit version of this simple model, that allow us to
further analyze the role of spatial interactions in determining deforestation levels.
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2.2 A Simple Spatial Game of Deforestation with Multiple Counties
One of the objective of the paper is to understand how spatial distribution can affect interactions
between counties. In this section, therefore, we will present our intuitions relying on a simplified
specified version of our previous model.
We consider here the potential implications of the two types of spatial interactions presented
above, using a specified version of the previous model.2
For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to two types of counties: if Xi = X, municipality i gets
higher relative direct benefits from deforestation, meaning that deforestation is highly profitable
and/or its outside opportunities are low; if Xi = X, municipality i gets low relative direct benefits
from deforestation, meaning that deforestation provides low profit and/or its outside opportunities
are high. We consider two types of spatial distribution of agents, that we called concentration and
dissemination cases (see Figure B.1).
Regarding spatial interaction, we assume for simplicity that (1) they only matter trough exoge-
nous characteristics (αij= 0), and (2) they only matter between direct neighbors, i.e., δij ∈]0; 1] if
i and j are direct neighbors, δij = 0 if not. Note also that interactions are small when δij is close
to 0 and important if it is close to 1.
Interactions with neighbors are determined by either subsitution or complementarity effects: in
the first case, a neighbor with X (resp. X) characteristics will have a large (resp. small) negative
impact on municipality i’s return from deforestation; in the second one, it will have a large (resp.
small) positive impact.
Finally, we apply a simple form of quadratic utility function:
Ui(Di, Xi,
∑
j Ó=i
δijDj) = (aXi ±
∑
j Ó=i
βijXj)Di −
1
2
D2i (3)
The optimal deforestation level of any municipality i is corresponds to the equalization of
marginal benefit and marginal cost of deforestation:
D∗i = aXi ±
∑
j Ó=i
βijXj . (4)
This specification allows us to highlight three factors: (ı) the level of interaction, which may be
high or low; (ıı) spatial distribution, as counties of the same type may be either concentrated or
disseminated; (ııı) substitutability or complementarity of interactions.
2The value of the parameters are given in the Appendix.
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This simple setting provides several insights. By looking at illustrative Figures C.1, D.1, E.1
and F.1 (in the Appendix), it appears that a higher level of spatial interactions tends to increase
overall deforestation in a complementarity situation, while it decreases it in a substitution situation.
Moreover, in a complementarity situation (see Figures C.1 and D.1), deforestation from X counties
is higher when counties of the same type are concentrated rather than disseminated, while
deforestation from X counties is lower (higher) when counties of the same type are concentrated
(disseminated). In contrast, in a substitutability situation (Figures E.1 and F.1), X counties
have lower levels of deforestation when concentrated (compared to the disseminated case), while
X counties have higher deforestation if concentrated. These insights are summarized in the
Proposition below.
Proposition 2: Concentration increases (resp. decrease) deforestation from X (resp. X) coun-
ties in a complementarity situation, while it tend to decrease (resp. increase) it in a substitution
situation. Dissemination decreases (resp. increases) deforestation from X (resp. X) counties in
a complementarity situation, while it tend to increase (resp. decrease) it in a substitution situation.
Overall, therefore, we are interesting in the next section in the understanding of the main
channels of spatial interactions between counties from the Brazilian Amazon, as well as the spatial
distribution of the variables that we will underline.
3 Investigating spatial interactions in the Brazilian Legal Amazon
deforestation process
3.1 Empirical methodology
The general spatial dynamic panel data model related to our theoretical model can be written
as:
Dit = αDi,t−1 + ρW1Djt + β1Xit + β2W1Xjt + νit,
νit = µi + γt + λW2νjt + ǫit,
(5)
where Dit is the level of deforestation for every municipality (i = 1, ..., N) in the sample at time t
(t = 1, ..., T ), W1 and W2 are non-negative spatial weight matrices, and Xit is a N ×K matrix of
explanatory variables. Di,t−1 and W1Djt are respectively the level of deforestation lagged in time
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and in space. Finally, νit is the overall error term of the model which can be divided into four parts:
µi represents the individual (fixed or random) effects, γt the time-period specific effects, W2 νjt is
the error term lagged in space and ǫit is the i.i.d distribution term.
To determine the best specification for our data, we estimate six variants of the general spatial
model:
• a Spatial Error Model (SEM) when α = ρ = β2 = 0 : in this case, the municipalities tend
to have the same deforestation behavior because they have unobservable characteristics that
are spatially autocorrelated.
• a Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) when α = β2 = λ = 0 : captures the endogenous
interaction effects which means that the deforestation level for one municipality is jointly
determined with that of neighboring municipalities.
• a Spatial Durbin model (SDM) obtained when α = λ = 0 : in this model we have both endoge-
nous interaction effects among the deforestation level (endogenous variable) and exogenous
interaction effects among the explanatory variables.
• a Spatial Autocorrelation Model (SAC) when α = β2 = 0 : catures endogenous interaction
effects and interaction among spatially autocorrelated error terms (omitted variables).
• a Dynamic Spatial Autoregressive Model (DSAR) when β2 = λ = 0 : takes into account
endogenous interaction effects and the dynamic of deforestation (time lagged variable of de-
forestation).
• a Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model (DSDM) when λ = 0 : captures the dynamic of deforestation
over the time, endogenous interaction effects and exogenous interaction effects.
So as to select among the six alternative models estimated, we use the Bayesian Information
Criteria (BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The results, presented in Table I.1
(See Appendix), indicate that the DSAR and DSDM models are preferred to the alternative models
according to both criteria. However, the AIC criterion prefers the DSDM model to the DSAR one,
while the result is reversed according to the BIC criterion. To decide between these two nested
models we apply the Likelihood Ratio Test. The corresponding statistic is 32.4, which allows us to
reject (at the 1% level) the hypothesis that the coefficients of spatially lagged explanatory variables
(β2) are equal to zero. Hence, for our data, the best specification is DSDM model, i.e. when λ = 0 in
model (5). In particular, this implies that we can abstract from correlated effects. This statistical
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result is consistent with economic theory of deforestation. Indeed, the rate of deforestation in
neighboring municipalities can be seen as a signal of market potential production (agricultural and
livestock) or as an alert on the adverse effects of deforestation. This can lead to complementarity or
substitution effects between the decisions of deforestation (Robalino and Pfaff, 2012; Angelsen and
Kaimowitz, 1998; Weinhold and Reis, 2008). Following recent developments in spatial econometrics
(Fingleton, 2011; LeSage, 2014) the SDM are appropriate in this case. In addition, several studies
have shown that deforestation is characterized by inertia phenomena (Andrade de S· et al., 2013).
In other words, the time lagged level of deforestation is a determinant of current deforestation.
Additionally, we apply the Hausman test to determine whether a fixed or random effects version
should be used. The test statistic χ2 is equal to 58.09, so we reject the null hypothesis of inde-
pendence between errors and explanatory variables and accordingly opt for a fixed-effects model.
Table I.2 in the Appendix presents the results of DSDM model with both fixed effects and random
effects.
Finally, using the DSDM model, we also estimate three specifications of the spatial weight
matrices: an inverse distance matrix (1/d), an inverse distance squared matrix (1/d2) and an
inverse distance cubed matrix (1/d3), where a higher exponent of the distance implies stronger
spatial interactions between a given MCA and its nearest neighbors. The spatial spillovers effects
are more significants in the last model (with inverse distance cubed matrix). This expected result
is related to the well-known first law of geography: ” Everything is related to everything else, but
near things are more related than distant things ” (Tobler, 1970, p. 236). In the remainder of this
paper, we discuss the results of this model.
To summarize, our reference model is a Dynamic Spatial Durbin Model (DSDM) with fixed-
effects model and an inverse distance cubed matrix. Results from this specification are presented
in the third column of Table 1. This specification allows to consider (i) the deforestation drivers
Xit determining county i’s deforestation (β1); (ii) the general direction and intensity of spatial
interaction, estimating endogenous effects (ρ); and (iii) local spillovers (β2), represented by the
parameters associated with spatially lagged independent explanatory variables, arise only in the
neighboring MCA.
To better appreciate the effects of spillovers associated with variation in a particular explanatory
variable, Lesage an Pace (2009) propose to estimate its estimated indirect effects which occur when
endogenous effects are observed (ρ Ó= 0). For instance, in our case study, these effects measure the
average impact of changes in an independent explanatory variable of MCA i on the deforestation
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Figure 1: Spatial Effects
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in all other MCA j. Indirect effects are global spillovers because they arise in all MCA, not just
neighboring MCA.
Direct effects will allow us to analyse the impact of the variation of an independent explanatory
variable of MCA i on the deforestation in MCA i. These effects also take into account the feedback
effects arising from the change in the ith MCA’s deforestation level on deforestation of neighboring
MCA in the system of spatially dependent MCA. The total effect of a given explanatory variable
is the sum of direct effects and indirect effects. The results of direct, indirect an total effects are
presented in the Table 2. The various spatial effects described in this section are summarized in
figure 1.
It is important to note that in the Spatial Durbin Model, the direct and indirect effects of a given
explanatory variable depend both on the estimated parameter β1 associated with this variable, and
on the estimated coefficient associated β2 with its spatially lagged value (Halleck Vega and Elhorst,
2012).
3.2 Dataset
We use a panel data set constituted of secondary data for all of Brazil’s Legal Amazon counties
for the years 2001-2010. For homogeneity issues, the municipal data is aggregated into 258 Minimum
Comparable Areas3 (MCAs). These constitute our units of observation, i. Tables G.1 and H.1 (see
3The list of Brazilian MCAs from 1970 to 2005 was provided by the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic
Research (Instituto de Pesquisa EconÙmica Aplicada, IPEA).
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Appendix), respectively, present a description of the main variables used in the analysis and offer
some descriptive statistics.
Deforestation data come from the geo-database of land use over the period 2001-2010 produced
by the PRODES System of the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisa Espacial - INPE (National Space
Research Center). The remaining land use data (cattle heads) were obtained from IBGE’s Pesquisa
Agricila Municipal (PAM) and Pesquisa Pecu·ria Municipal (PPM).
We also include GDP, percentage of agricultural GDP and population density as control vari-
ables. We used data on counties’ resident population to compute GDP per capita and population
density variables for our units of observation.
Finally, in 2004 the Brazilian government initiated a series of forest conversation measures via
the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (Plano de
Acção para a Prevenção e o Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia Legal, PPCDAm). In par-
ticular, this program consisted in closely monitoring forest conversion in sensitive areas, i.e. areas
at the forest frontier; a number of municipalities were selected according to their vulnerability to
forest conversion and prevention policies were implemented. For instance, from 2008 on, in the
selected municipalities, rural credits were made conditional on proof of compliance with environ-
mental regulations, which mainly consist in leaving a given percentage of land under forest in
each rural establishment. Thus, we introduced a time dummy (year_04) which takes value 1 in
2004 and subsequent years. We have also crossed with other explanatory variables to analyze the
differentiated effects of this program according to the characteristics of municipalities.
Figures 2-7 show that after 2004, deforestation has moved toward the MCAs with a high rate
of forest and where the agricultural GDP is low. One can see that, focusing on the forest cover and
on the agricultural GDP, the Brazilian Amazon is closer to a concentrated spatial distribution.
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Figure 2: Percentage of forest in the MCAs of
Brazilian Legal Amazon in 2000
Figure 3: Percentage of forest in the MCAs of
Brazilian Legal Amazon in 2004
Figure 4: Percentage of deforestation in the
MCAs of Brazilian Legal Amazon from 2001 to
2004
Figure 5: Percentage of deforestation in the
MCAs of Brazilian Legal Amazon from 2005
to 2010
13
Figure 6: Percentage of agricultural GDP in the
MCAs of Brazilian Legal Amazon from 2001 to
2004
Figure 7: Percentage of agricultural GDP in
the MCAs of Brazilian Legal Amazon from
2005 to 2010
4 Empirical Results
Our main empirical results are presented in Table 1 below. The presence of endogenous effects is
confirmed by a significant value of ρ. In particular, ρ > 0 is in line with a general complementarity
relation between deforestation in neighboring MCAs. Put differently, deforestation levels in a
given MCA tend to be similar to those of its neighbors. Figures 4 and 5 show that deforestation
is concentrated at the deforestation frontier (in southern Amazonia), but move more and more
towards the north. Deforestation decisions being strategic complements, spatial concentration will
tend to strengthen the dynamics of deforestation according to our theoretical predictions.
In the following the section, we discuss the results obtained. In Section 4.1, we discuss the
role of the main traditional deforestation drivers, while in Section 4.2 we discuss the issue of local
spillovers. In section 4.3, we present the results of global spillovers, the total effects in section 4.4
and we discuss the hypothesis of a non-linearity effect of rainfall, GDP and forest cover in section
4.5.
4.1 Main effects: the traditional deforestation drivers
First, the time lag coefficient of deforestation is positive (α > 0) and significant at the 1%
level, meaning that past deforestation in one municipality tends to favor current forest clearing.
This result confirms the fact that deforestation is relatively persistent over time and is a process
exhibiting a temporal inertia.
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Table 1: Estimation results with spatial models with different weights matrix
DSDM DSDM DSDM
1/d c1/d2 1/d3
L.cleared 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.176***
(0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0122)
gdpcap -0.289 0.339 1.273
(3.446) (3.544) (3.543)
gdpagric 87.45 108.4 144.8**
(67.52) (67.94) (66.80)
pop_dens -0.0191 0.111 0.0967
(0.546) (0.579) (0.581)
forest 0.00676*** 0.00885*** 0.0118***
(0.00260) (0.00290) (0.00307)
cattle 0.0000481 0.0000630* 0.0000701*
(0.0000340) (0.0000357) (0.0000377)
precip 0.0816*** 0.195*** 0.367***
(0.0312) (0.0478) (0.0628)
year2004 -243.6 -89.82 -16.20
(183.1) (74.35) (50.62)
gdpcap04 1.852 1.580 0.919
(1.998) (2.149) (2.234)
gdpagri04 -128.0*** -122.8*** -111.4**
(46.85) (47.25) (47.10)
pop_dens04 -0.0228 -0.0276 -0.0271
(0.0556) (0.0601) (0.0611)
forest04 -0.000983*** -0.000934*** -0.000892***
(0.000225) (0.000229) (0.000232)
cattle04 -0.000217*** -0.000217*** -0.000216***
(0.00000775) (0.00000814) (0.00000834)
precip04 -0.0480* -0.0963** -0.158***
(0.0284) (0.0428) (0.0573)
Wx
gdpcap -10.81 -8.383 -11.70
(21.54) (9.816) (7.853)
gdpagric -36.98 61.31 31.37
(452.3) (176.7) (116.4)
pop_dens 4.468 0.378 0.0439
(2.778) (1.106) (0.735)
forest 0.00776 -0.0126 -0.0180**
(0.0223) (0.0120) (0.00838)
cattle 0.000341 -0.000112 -0.000215
(0.000282) (0.000252) (0.000226)
precip -0.179*** -0.259*** -0.410***
(0.0611) (0.0598) (0.0687)
gdpcap04 -0.279 -2.134 0.897
(15.27) (5.999) (4.743)
gdpagri04 643.7 325.3** 182.3**
(419.4) (149.4) (92.05)
pop_dens04 -0.548 -0.0485 -0.0101
(0.417) (0.135) (0.0859)
forest04 0.00306* 0.00117 0.000974*
(0.00164) (0.000734) (0.000568)
cattle04 -0.0000174 0.0000701 0.0000560
(0.000147) (0.0000694) (0.0000533)
precip04 0.125** 0.132** 0.172***
(0.0615) (0.0540) (0.0619)
ρ 0.585*** 0.345*** 0.231***
(0.112) (0.0620) (0.0428)
sigma2_e 17091.2*** 16959.6*** 16788.8***
(461.3) (460.2) (456.3)
Observations 2232 2232 2232
AIC 27995.0 27989.8 27969.6
BIC 28377.6 28372.4 28352.2
Log lik. -13930.5 -13927.9 -13917.8
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Second, looking at the β1s, we observe that as expected, more cattle ranching, area of natural
forest, percentage of agricultural GDP or rainfall in a given MCA is associated with higher levels
of deforestation. However, note that this relationship is reversed after 2004, when the PPCDAm
program was implemented. This is because, by aiming at fighting forest conversion in the Legal
Amazon, this program was designed to specifically target high risk municipalities. Hence, when
interacting cattle, area of natural forest, percentage of agricultural GDP or rainfall, with that of
year2004 (cattle04), we observe that the associated coefficient is now negative and significant to
the 1% level. This result gives the insight that the PPCDAM managed to target efficiently the
counties in which deforestation drivers and thus deforestation pressure were the most important.
4.2 Local Spillovers : spatially lagged explanatory variables
Local spillovers (β2s) are presented in the second part of Table 1. These effects translate
how the characteristics of neighbors affect deforestation in a given MCA. As we can see, more
hectares of primary forest and higher rainfall in neighboring areas tend to be associated with lower
deforestation rates in each MCA. This result is not really surprising: counties surrounded by MCA
with larger forest cover tend to be "protected" from deforestation pressures. In contrast, counties
located at the deforestation frontier, are surrounded by other counties already experiencing large
levels of deforestation and then lower forest cover, which increase deforestation pressures in the
neighborhood.
This relationship is reversed after the implementation of PPCDAm program. Indeed, after
2004, it became more difficult to clear forests for economic activities in MCA with high rates of
deforestation (equivalently low remaining forest cover). This result suggests that there was a leakage
of deforestation to the MCA with low deforestation rates. Moreover, this result gives this insight
that public policy implementation tends to completely modify the nature of spatial interactions of
deforestation. This tends to show that the nature of spatial interactions related to socio-economic
factors are rather different than the one related to policy implementation. This result is in line
with Ewers and Rodrigues (2008) who have shown that the establishment of protected areas can,
in some cases, simply lead to a displacement of deforestation towards unprotected areas.
When looking at figures 2, 3, 6 and 7, one can see that the South East and East regions are the
ones where those spatial spillovers are the most detrimental to forest loss. Zones where deforestation
pressure is the most important are also the ones where spatial interactions have the most important
effects.
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4.3 Global Spillovers : Indirect effects
The indirect effects associated with forest area and rainfall variable are significant and negative,
suggesting they are factors of substitutability: larger forest area or rainfall that increase deforesta-
tion in a given MCA (direct effects) also leads to a reduction of deforestation in all others MCAs
(global spillovers).
However, after 2004 a high level of percentage of agricultural GDP (or rainfall) in a particular
MCA favors deforestation in all others MCAs. In other words, a high level of percentage of agri-
cultural GDP (or rainfall) in a MCA helps to reduce deforestation in this MCA (direct effect), but
at the same time it leads to an increase in deforestation in all other MCAs (global spillovers). This
program contributed to displace deforestation to targeted MCAs with high percentage of agricul-
tural GDP to non-targeted MCAs with relatively low percentage of agricultural GDP, via a leakage
effect.
4.4 Total effects
The total effect associated with cattle and rainfall are significant and negative. This means
that the increase of rainfall in one MCA or cattle in one targeted MCA will lead an decrease of
deforestation in all other MCAs. Therefore, policies based on these two variables could affect all
Brazilian Amazon.
4.5 Robustness check: looking for non-linearities
Economics theory and previous studies suggest that some variables may exhibit non linearities
in their on deforestation. As a robustness check of our previous results, we thus perform some
further regressions introducing the square of three key variables: forest area (testing for the forest
transition hypothesis), GDP (testing for an Environmental Kuznets Curve), and rainfall. The
results of nonlinearity test are shown in Table I.3 and direct, indirect and total effects in Table I.4
(See Appendix).
First, we focus on the impact of the forest area. This idea is related to forest transition hypoth-
esis. According to the hypothesis of the forest transition, deforestation progresses as agricultural
rent is above the forest rent. Since forest rent increases with the reduction of the forest cover
(increasing the opportunity cost of reducing the forest cover and reducing goods and services of
the forest), the increase of deforestation provides a very important feedback that helps to stabilize
forest cover (Angelsen, 2007). Therefore deforestation and forest cover are related by an U-shaped
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relationship. According to our results, the total effect of forest is negative and significant while
forest2 (forest area squared) has a significant and positive effect. This means that the forest area
has a positive effect on deforestation when it exceeds 77,413km2 and a negative effect otherwise.
In terms of public policy, these results suggest that the actions against deforestation should put
more effort in the MCA with forest area above 77,413km2, who are likely to experience larger
deforestation pressures.
Second, the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis relates deforestation and income
by an inverted U-shaped relationship (Culas, 2012; Choumert et al., 2012). According to our
results, the main effects (β1) and direct effects do not exhibit an EKC for deforestation: GDP
per capita and its quadratic term have the correct sign, but are not significant. As Direct effects
measure the impact of explanatory variables of MCA on its own deforestation, we can conclude
that our study does not support the EKC hypothesis. Similar results were found in the literature
(Choumert et al., 2012). However, local spillovers (β2) and indirect effects of GDP is negative and
significant while the quadratic term is significant and positive. This result gives the insight of an
inverse spatial EKC for deforestation: GDP of a particular MCA in related to deforestation of all
others municipalities by U-shaped form. In other words, the GDP of a given MCA has negative
influence on the deforestation in all others municipalities up to a certain threshold (18.29 R $) from
which its impact becomes positive. This result seems logical since a high GDP in a given MCA
(given that agricultural is the main driver of GDP in the Amazon’s) may be perceived by others
MCA as a signal of their future level of gdp if they increase their levels of deforestation.
Finally, as expected, rainfall has a positive effect on deforestation while its quadratic term has
a negative effect. Indeed, too much rainfall does not favor agricultural activities.
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Table 2: Direct, Indirect, and Total effects
DSDM DSDM DSDM
1/d c1/d2 1/d3
Direct
gdpcap -0.147 0.378 1.019
(3.738) (3.818) (3.780)
gdpagric 90.56 114.2 150.4**
(73.21) (73.45) (72.05)
pop_dens 0.0318 0.124 0.100
(0.513) (0.542) (0.544)
forest 0.00739*** 0.00911*** 0.0116***
(0.00237) (0.00259) (0.00273)
cattle 0.0000603* 0.0000682** 0.0000684**
(0.0000331) (0.0000330) (0.0000334)
precip 0.0790** 0.188*** 0.350***
(0.0329) (0.0495) (0.0641)
year2004 -251.6 -92.73 -17.61
(177.4) (74.04) (50.85)
gdpcap04 1.681 1.325 0.753
(1.889) (2.011) (2.065)
gdpagri04 -124.2** -116.6** -105.7**
(48.70) (49.06) (48.78)
pop_dens04 -0.0277 -0.0281 -0.0267
(0.0551) (0.0597) (0.0606)
forest04 -0.000957*** -0.000911*** -0.000857***
(0.000222) (0.000222) (0.000221)
cattle04 -0.000219*** -0.000218*** -0.000216***
(0.00000824) (0.00000830) (0.00000836)
precip04 -0.0514* -0.101** -0.162***
(0.0285) (0.0413) (0.0547)
Indirect
gdpcap -27.37 -11.22 -13.35
(59.85) (13.54) (8.925)
gdpagric -54.95 110.0 54.09
(1337.1) (264.1) (142.8)
pop_dens 10.76 0.447 -0.00191
(9.057) (1.663) (0.914)
forest 0.0229 -0.0163 -0.0205**
(0.0677) (0.0170) (0.00958)
cattle 0.000958 -0.000160 -0.000273
(0.000768) (0.000370) (0.000280)
precip -0.337** -0.285*** -0.405***
(0.151) (0.0656) (0.0694)
year2004 -422.8 -49.12 -5.116
(462.9) (43.90) (15.29)
gdpcap04 2.752 -2.544 1.336
(40.82) (8.048) (5.180)
gdpagri04 1546.1 440.6** 207.1**
(1254.0) (212.2) (104.6)
pop_dens04 -1.281 -0.0604 -0.00720
(1.369) (0.222) (0.115)
forest04 0.00715 0.00137 0.00101
(0.00535) (0.00114) (0.000742)
cattle04 -0.000428 -0.0000135 0.00000575
(0.000460) (0.0000942) (0.0000598)
precip04 0.257 0.156*** 0.179***
(0.161) (0.0587) (0.0592)
Total
gdpcap -27.52 -10.84 -12.33
(59.00) (12.74) (8.322)
gdpagric 35.61 224.3 204.5
(1351.2) (281.6) (163.9)
pop_dens 10.80 0.570 0.0984
(8.949) (1.546) (0.861)
forest 0.0303 -0.00719 -0.00886
(0.0672) (0.0161) (0.00856)
cattle 0.00102 -0.0000921 -0.000205
(0.000761) (0.000363) (0.000273)
precip -0.258* -0.0974*** -0.0556**
(0.141) (0.0329) (0.0218)
year2004 -674.4 -141.9 -22.73
(602.0) (115.5) (65.79)
gdpcap04 4.433 -1.219 2.089
(40.77) (7.808) (4.804)
gdpagri04 1421.9 324.0 101.3
(1270.9) (229.0) (122.0)
pop_dens04 -1.309 -0.0885 -0.0339
(1.356) (0.204) (0.103)
forest04 0.00620 0.000461 0.000153
(0.00534) (0.00109) (0.000686)
cattle04 -0.000647 -0.000232** -0.000210***
(0.000460) (0.0000930) (0.0000586)
precip04 0.206 0.0554 0.0174
(0.152) (0.0338) (0.0203)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5 Discussion and Conclusions
Using a simple theoretical model and methods of spatial econometrics, this paper investigates
the spatial interactions underlying the deforestation process in the Brazilian Amazon, as well as
the most determinant variables in explaining these interactions. We show that complementarity
tends to be the general pattern behind deforestation: the higher MCA i’s neighbors’ deforestation,
the higher its own level of forest conversion will be. This result confirms previous results obtained
by Robalino and Pfaff (2012) in Costa Rica. By analyzing the spillover effects associated with
each explanatory variable, we additionally show that the variables that appear to be the strongest
diffusion channels of deforestation are higher percentage of agricultural GDP and rainfall after
2004. In contrast, a high primary forest and rainfall (before 2004) tend to have negative spillover
effects on deforestation. It also appears that the primary forest, the precipitation, the percentage
of agricultural GDP (after 2004) and rainfall (after 2004) lead to situations of substitutability.
Indeed, when these variables have a positive influence on deforestation in the MCA, they have in
the same time a negative spillover effect on deforestation.
Our results also suggest that the program has helped reduce deforestation. In fact, before 2004,
the primary forest, rainfall and cattle were factors promoting deforestation. But after 2004, these
variables have negatively influenced deforestation. Yet this program has also caused leakage of
deforestation toward municipalities with low deforestation rates. For instance, our results suggest
that, after the implementation of the program in 2004, an increase in percentage of agricultural
GDP in a municipality lead to an increase of deforestation in all other municipalities (spillover
effects). Therefore, to be fully effective, policies against deforestation must take into account the
spillover effects. Indeed these effects can make policies more effective when they generate synergy
effects or less effective when they generate leakages.
Finally, our results supported the forest transition hypothesis. Indeed, we show that the pri-
mary forest has a positive effect on deforestation when it exceeds 77,413km2 and a negative effect
otherwise. The policies aiming to fight against deforestation tend to focus on regions with high
rates of deforestation. However, this result suggests to also focus on areas with large primary forest,
as they may experience stronger deforestation pressure in the near future. Moreover, these regions
have the advantage of having a pristine biological and ecological ecosystem.
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Appendices
A Value of the simulation parameters
Table A.1
X 5
X 0
αij Low interactions 0.05
High interactions 0.1
D∗i ∈ [−2; 9]
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B Illustration of concentration and dissemination cases
Figure B.1: Maps of counties for the concentration and the dissemination cases
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C Complementarity and Concentration
Figure C.1: Deforestation map in case of complementarity and counties concentration
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D Complementarity and Dissemination
Figure D.1: Deforestation map in case of complementarity and counties dissemination
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E Substitutability and Concentration
Figure E.1: Deforestation map in case of substitutability and counties concentration
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F Substitutability and Dissemination
Figure F.1: Deforestation map in case of substitutability and counties dissemination
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G Variables description
Table G.1: Main variables description
Variable Definition Source
cleared Hectares of land cleared Prodes
gdpcap GDP per capita (R$ of 2000) IPEAdata
pop_dens Population density (Total MCA popula-
tion/MCA area)
IPEAdata
forest Surface of forest in the MCA in hectares Prodes
corn Hectares of land under corn IBGE - Agricultural Census
cotton Hectares of land under cotton IBGE - Agricultural Census
soy Hectares of land under soy IBGE - Agricultural Census
sugarcane Hectares of land under sugarcane IBGE - Agricultural Census
precip Average yearly precipitations in milliliters IPEAdata
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H Summary statistics
Table H.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
cleared 84.463 404.889 0 6359.7
gdpcap 3.061 3.423 0.757 43.849
gdpcap2 21.083 94.782 0.573 1922.775
gdpagric 0.273 0.146 0.001 0.792
pop_dens 41.777 193.461 0.092 2617.719
forest 13105.184 37132.661 0 320163.502
forest2 1550024421.04 8458476753.388 0 102504669184
cattle 275047.006 1051410.95 0 11842073
precip 2088.608 605.804 856.349 4025.641
precip2 4729132.547 2687750.021 733334.125 16205786
an04 0.6 0.49 0 1
gdpcap04 1.948 3.103 0 40.443
gdpagri04 0.158 0.171 0 0.729
pop_dens04 25.956 156.921 0 2617.719
forest04 7669.253 28851.156 0 317854.594
cattle04 177126.94 885146.937 0 11842073
precip04 1277.97 1155.26 0 3598.18
N 2480
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I Empirical Results
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Table I.1: Comparison of spatial models
Model SAR SDM SEM SAC DSAR DSDM
gdpcap -0.307 -0.192 0.267 -0.00171 -0.894 -0.289
(4.048) (4.322) (4.242) (4.182) (3.207) (3.446)
gdpagric 178.7** 174.8** 198.7** 179.4** 80.60 87.45
(80.88) (87.99) (86.08) (84.83) (62.23) (67.52)
pop_dens 0.463 0.621 0.582 0.546 0.0785 -0.0191
(0.656) (0.683) (0.680) (0.672) (0.514) (0.546)
forest 0.0168*** 0.0165*** 0.0166*** 0.0166*** 0.00830*** 0.00676***
(0.00323) (0.00356) (0.00337) (0.00333) (0.00232) (0.00260)
cattle 0.000139*** 0.000133*** 0.000140*** 0.000139*** 0.0000538 0.0000481
(0.0000377) (0.0000387) (0.0000384) (0.0000379) (0.0000329) (0.0000340)
precip 0.00550 0.0730* 0.0356 0.0306 0.00544 0.0816***
(0.0215) (0.0391) (0.0328) (0.0317) (0.0168) (0.0312)
year2004 161.8*** 244.3 233.4*** 244.8*** 113.1*** -243.6
(42.79) (240.1) (89.54) (70.62) (32.66) (183.1)
gdpcap04 7.203*** 3.068 3.700 4.117 3.409** 1.852
(2.367) (2.803) (2.586) (2.546) (1.691) (1.998)
gdpagri04 -202.7*** -239.2*** -237.1*** -223.7*** -96.43** -128.0***
(61.73) (64.12) (62.97) (62.19) (44.69) (46.85)
pop_dens04 -0.106 -0.0865 -0.0888 -0.0900 -0.0539 -0.0228
(0.0745) (0.0777) (0.0768) (0.0758) (0.0526) (0.0556)
forest04 -0.00114*** -0.00201*** -0.00164*** -0.00153*** -0.000606*** -0.000983***
(0.000271) (0.000307) (0.000289) (0.000286) (0.000197) (0.000225)
cattle04 -0.000233*** -0.000229*** -0.000233*** -0.000231*** -0.000218*** -0.000217***
(0.0000104) (0.0000107) (0.0000106) (0.0000104) (0.00000750) (0.00000775)
precip04 -0.0288* -0.0852** -0.0391* -0.0367* -0.0203* -0.0480*
(0.0153) (0.0376) (0.0225) (0.0215) (0.0121) (0.0284)
L.cleared 0.184*** 0.181***
(0.0122) (0.0123)
ρ 0.851*** 0.873*** 0.709*** 0.558*** 0.585***
(0.0402) (0.0365) (0.0774) (0.0946) (0.112)
λ 0.880*** 0.814***
(0.0340) (0.0542)
Variance
sigma2_e 34924.2*** 33953.5*** 34373.2*** 37345.7*** 17335.6*** 17091.2***
(995.6) (968.4) (980.2) (961.3) (467.6) (461.3)
Wx
gdpcap -24.33 -10.81
(29.08) (21.54)
gdpagric 1075.5* -36.98
(577.8) (452.3)
pop_dens -2.281 4.468
(3.513) (2.778)
forest -0.0228 0.00776
(0.0308) (0.0223)
cattle 0.000229 0.000341
(0.000338) (0.000282)
precip -0.0623 -0.179***
(0.0770) (0.0611)
gdpcap04 30.71 -0.279
(21.30) (15.27)
gdpagri04 -686.8 643.7
(553.6) (419.4)
pop_dens04 0.0344 -0.548
(0.567) (0.417)
forest04 0.00655*** 0.00306*
(0.00227) (0.00164)
cattle04 0.0000418 -0.0000174
(0.000204) (0.000147)
precip04 0.0573 0.125**
(0.0804) (0.0615)
Observations 2480 2480 2480 2480 2232 2232
AIC 33047.3 33005.2 33012.9 32969.9 27924.5 27917.0
BIC 33134.6 33162.2 33100.1 33062.9 28015.9 28076.9
Log lik. -16508.7 -16475.6 -16491.5 -16468.9 -13946.2 -13930.5
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table I.2: Estimation results DSDM : fixed effects vs random effects
Model Fixed effects Random effects
L.cleared 0.181*** 0.357***
(0.0123) (0.0122)
gdpcap -0.289 -3.810**
(3.446) (1.843)
gdpagric 87.45 153.8***
(67.52) (43.53)
pop_dens -0.0191 0.0265
(0.546) (0.0336)
forest 0.00676*** 0.00255***
(0.00260) (0.000203)
cattle 0.0000481 0.000272***
(0.0000340) (0.00000786)
precip 0.0816*** 0.0481*
(0.0312) (0.0270)
year2004 -243.6 -295.9
(183.1) (207.3)
gdpcap04 1.852 1.775
(1.998) (2.310)
gdpagri04 -128.0*** -109.6**
(46.85) (54.00)
pop_dens04 -0.0228 -0.0230
(0.0556) (0.0400)
forest04 -0.000983*** -0.00109***
(0.000225) (0.000241)
cattle04 -0.000217*** -0.000215***
(0.00000775) (0.00000803)
precip04 -0.0480* -0.0231
(0.0284) (0.0327)
Constant 302.2
(189.5)
Wx
gdpcap -10.81 1.562
(21.54) (14.19)
gdpagric -36.98 -770.7*
(452.3) (421.2)
pop_dens 4.468 0.336
(2.778) (0.334)
forest 0.00776 -0.00539***
(0.0223) (0.00144)
cattle 0.000341 0.0000997
(0.000282) (0.000145)
precip -0.179*** -0.143**
(0.0611) (0.0626)
gdpcap04 -0.279 -4.393
(15.27) (17.10)
gdpagri04 643.7 851.4*
(419.4) (467.0)
pop_dens04 -0.548 -0.248
(0.417) (0.390)
forest04 0.00306* 0.00171
(0.00164) (0.00177)
cattle04 -0.0000174 -0.0000723
(0.000147) (0.000171)
precip04 0.125** 0.104
(0.0615) (0.0703)
ρ 0.585*** 0.469***
(0.112) (0.115)
sigma2_e 17091.2*** -148.1***
(461.3) (2.220)
sigma_a 7.56e-08
(16.32)
Observations 2232 2232
AIC 27917.0 28711.2
BIC 28076.9 28882.6
Log lik. -13930.5 -14325.6
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table I.3: Nonlinearity Test
DSDM : GDP DSDM : Rainfall DSDM : Forest DSDM : GDP, Rainfall and Forest
L.cleared 0.175*** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.174***
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0124)
gdpcap 4.219 1.487 1.465 4.441
(7.306) (3.532) (3.546) (7.307)
gdpcap2 -0.0881 -0.0869
(0.158) (0.158)
gdpagric 139.2** 153.2** 140.5** 136.7**
(68.00) (66.59) (66.92) (68.11)
pop_dens 0.113 0.0931 0.110 0.120
(0.581) (0.579) (0.581) (0.580)
forest 0.0119*** 0.0125*** 0.0121** 0.0125**
(0.00307) (0.00307) (0.00551) (0.00550)
cattle 0.0000686* 0.0000714* 0.0000725* 0.0000711*
(0.0000377) (0.0000376) (0.0000385) (0.0000385)
precip 0.370*** 1.102*** 0.358*** 0.458***
(0.0628) (0.188) (0.0630) (0.0869)
an04 -1.010 -20.47 -21.52 -11.41
(51.27) (50.66) (50.70) (51.41)
gdpcap04 0.574 0.671 0.865 0.439
(2.302) (2.227) (2.238) (2.306)
gdpagri04 -114.7** -110.7** -110.6** -114.9**
(47.09) (46.93) (47.15) (47.12)
pop_dens04 -0.0289 -0.0265 -0.0274 -0.0291
(0.0611) (0.0609) (0.0611) (0.0611)
forest04 -0.000899*** -0.000885*** -0.000920*** -0.000928***
(0.000233) (0.000231) (0.000262) (0.000262)
cattle04 -0.000216*** -0.000215*** -0.000216*** -0.000216***
(0.00000834) (0.00000831) (0.00000870) (0.00000869)
precip04 -0.160*** -0.176*** -0.154*** -0.161***
(0.0573) (0.0573) (0.0575) (0.0576)
precip2 -0.000154*** -0.0000189
(0.0000372) (0.0000117)
forest2 -3.02e-09 -3.74e-09
(1.58e-08) (1.58e-08)
Wx
gdpcap -34.15** -10.34 -11.31 -36.45***
(13.82) (7.832) (7.851) (13.88)
gdpcap2 0.934** 1.051**
(0.468) (0.472)
gdpagric 45.36 -15.43 18.62 38.88
(116.7) (116.7) (116.5) (116.8)
pop_dens 0.128 0.0447 -0.0163 -0.0395
(0.737) (0.737) (0.736) (0.740)
forest -0.0189** -0.0185** -0.0355*** -0.0351***
(0.00838) (0.00837) (0.0133) (0.0133)
cattle -0.000196 -0.000187 -0.000191 -0.000189
(0.000226) (0.000226) (0.000226) (0.000227)
precip -0.408*** -1.162*** -0.399*** -0.420***
(0.0687) (0.201) (0.0690) (0.0706)
gdpcap04 2.910 1.358 0.444 2.718
(4.852) (4.727) (4.751) (4.858)
gdpagri04 170.0* 202.3** 196.7** 177.0*
(92.20) (91.98) (92.33) (92.54)
pop_dens04 -0.0171 0.00363 0.00304 0.0125
(0.0862) (0.0864) (0.0862) (0.0870)
forest04 0.000952* 0.00108* 0.00138** 0.00124**
(0.000568) (0.000572) (0.000615) (0.000619)
cattle04 0.0000521 0.0000444 0.0000697 0.0000656
(0.0000533) (0.0000532) (0.0000538) (0.0000538)
precip04 0.169*** 0.187*** 0.166*** 0.174***
(0.0619) (0.0621) (0.0621) (0.0625)
precip2 0.000158***
(0.0000407)
forest2 0.000000160* 0.000000152*
(8.82e-08) (8.83e-08)
rho 0.228*** 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.224***
(0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0430)
sigma2_e 16762.2*** 16667.9*** 16768.7*** 16722.5***
(455.5) (452.9) (455.7) (454.3)
Observations 2232 2232 2232 2232
AIC 27975.6 27962.5 27976.3 27987.5
BIC 28386.8 28373.6 28387.4 28450.1
Log lik. -13915.8 -13909.2 -13916.1 -13912.8
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table I.4: Nonlinearity Test : Direct, Indirect and Total effects
DSDM : GDP DSDM : Rainfall DSDM : Forest DSDM : GDP, Rainfall and Forest
Direct
gdpcap 3.123 1.237 1.163 3.300
(7.955) (3.810) (3.829) (7.847)
gdpcap2 -0.0495 -0.0429
(0.164) (0.164)
gdpagric 142.4** 157.4** 146.2** 139.5**
(64.01) (69.94) (70.17) (63.81)
pop_dens 0.243 0.101 0.116 0.238
(0.548) (0.545) (0.546) (0.544)
forest 0.0117*** 0.0124*** 0.0117** 0.0121**
(0.00292) (0.00276) (0.00500) (0.00533)
cattle 0.0000619* 0.0000719** 0.0000662* 0.0000609*
(0.0000362) (0.0000340) (0.0000376) (0.0000345)
precip 0.352*** 1.062*** 0.339*** 0.436***
(0.0603) (0.191) (0.0614) (0.0794)
an04 -4.779 -23.64 -24.67 -8.201
(47.63) (47.25) (47.64) (49.58)
gdpcap04 0.639 0.692 0.835 0.372
(2.409) (2.289) (2.267) (2.211)
gdpagri04 -105.6** -101.5** -101.2** -110.7**
(47.47) (46.32) (46.85) (47.07)
pop_dens04 -0.0433 -0.0297 -0.0307 -0.0487
(0.0568) (0.0578) (0.0581) (0.0571)
forest04 -0.000851*** -0.000837*** -0.000854*** -0.000860***
(0.000245) (0.000250) (0.000267) (0.000235)
cattle04 -0.000217*** -0.000218*** -0.000216*** -0.000215***
(0.00000769) (0.00000723) (0.00000804) (0.00000847)
precip04 -0.146*** -0.161*** -0.139** -0.155***
(0.0546) (0.0556) (0.0548) (0.0584)
precip2 -0.000149*** -0.0000186*
(0.0000370) (0.0000105)
forest2 3.10e-09 6.21e-10
(1.61e-08) (1.70e-08)
Indirect
gdpcap -44.12** -14.11 -15.39 -44.67***
(17.50) (9.843) (9.914) (15.80)
gdpcap2 1.189* 1.308**
(0.609) (0.569)
gdpagric 99.64 17.97 57.74 92.35
(134.6) (139.1) (141.3) (136.8)
pop_dens 0.207 0.0983 0.0280 -0.0927
(0.839) (0.834) (0.833) (0.815)
forest -0.0214** -0.0201** -0.0413*** -0.0406***
(0.0101) (0.00942) (0.0153) (0.0156)
cattle -0.000221 -0.000222 -0.000212 -0.000208
(0.000249) (0.000277) (0.000250) (0.000276)
precip -0.399*** -1.139*** -0.392*** -0.389***
(0.0643) (0.202) (0.0645) (0.0688)
an04 -0.768 -5.926 -6.211 -2.086
(14.05) (13.47) (13.78) (13.18)
gdpcap04 4.296 2.329 1.267 4.096
(6.160) (5.715) (5.925) (6.149)
gdpagri04 184.3* 225.1** 216.9** 180.2*
(110.3) (102.4) (103.9) (109.0)
pop_dens04 -0.0281 -0.00279 -0.00413 0.0152
(0.0982) (0.100) (0.0994) (0.0984)
forest04 0.000927 0.00111 0.00144* 0.00122
(0.000743) (0.000693) (0.000820) (0.000748)
cattle04 0.00000898 0.000000347 0.0000290 0.0000276
(0.0000674) (0.0000652) (0.0000682) (0.0000684)
precip04 0.158*** 0.174*** 0.156*** 0.171***
(0.0576) (0.0583) (0.0572) (0.0652)
precip2 0.000155*** -0.00000520
(0.0000399) (0.00000336)
forest2 0.000000188* 0.000000185*
(0.000000108) (0.000000106)
Total
gdpcap -41.00** -12.87 -14.23 -41.37***
(17.92) (9.675) (9.764) (15.04)
gdpcap2 1.139* 1.265**
(0.600) (0.568)
gdpagric 242.1* 175.4 204.0 231.8*
(143.0) (137.2) (137.7) (139.4)
pop_dens 0.451 0.199 0.144 0.145
(0.869) (0.837) (0.834) (0.786)
forest -0.00966 -0.00765 -0.0296** -0.0285**
(0.00892) (0.00848) (0.0146) (0.0142)
cattle -0.000159 -0.000150 -0.000146 -0.000147
(0.000244) (0.000270) (0.000245) (0.000271)
precip -0.0478** -0.0779 -0.0528** 0.0472
(0.0233) (0.0603) (0.0224) (0.0589)
an04 -5.546 -29.56 -30.88 -10.29
(61.49) (60.55) (61.24) (62.42)
gdpcap04 4.936 3.022 2.102 4.469
(5.549) (5.083) (5.286) (5.636)
gdpagri04 78.67 123.6 115.7 69.50
(120.9) (113.2) (114.8) (113.4)
pop_dens04 -0.0714 -0.0325 -0.0348 -0.0335
(0.0942) (0.0947) (0.0939) (0.0919)
forest04 0.0000766 0.000276 0.000584 0.000359
(0.000728) (0.000671) (0.000797) (0.000722)
cattle04 -0.000208*** -0.000217*** -0.000187*** -0.000188***
(0.0000662) (0.0000644) (0.0000673) (0.0000680)
precip04 0.0120 0.0135 0.0168 0.0166
(0.0197) (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0201)
precip2 0.00000555 -0.0000238*
(0.0000142) (0.0000136)
forest2 0.000000191* 0.000000185*
(0.000000114) (0.000000109)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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